Investment Opportunities in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects

• Ukraine's Investment Climate: Myths and Reality
• Investment and Innovation Policy of Ukrainian Government: Achievements and Drawbacks
• Reform Practice
  National Program on Promotion of Ukraine's Small Business in the System of State Support for Small Business
• Research
  Investment Attractiveness Rating of Ukrainian Regions
• Agrarian Reform
  Agrarian Reform in 2000: Any Grounds for Optimism?
• In the Light of Reform
  Investments and Ukraine's Economic Development: Econometrics versus Stereotypes
• Special Section
  Problems of and Prospects for Alternative Sales Tax in the Ukrainian Taxation System
  
• Research
  SigmaBleyzer's Views On The Ukrainian Crisis
  

Ukraine's Investment Climate: Myths and Reality

By Sergiy Kulytsky, head of the economic analysis department of the information and analytical service to state authorities of the Vernadskiy National Library of Ukraine and Natalia Omelyanchyk, doctor of economics, chief research officer at the Scientific Research Institute for Economics at the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, senior research officer at the Vernadski National Library

1. Subject of analysis

As far as prospects for Ukraine's economic development are concerned, it is worthwhile to examine the issue of formation and assessment of the Ukrainian investment climate, which is an important factor determining those prospects. Experts and representatives of the mass media differ in their opinions apropos of the above problem. However, publications of various viewpoints in the press give birth to the following paradox: assessments of Ukraine's investment climate are unclear, vague and sometimes emotional, though their results can influence behavior of the majority of potential investors. Hence, first and foremost, we would like to determine the subject of analysis.
As a rule, investment climate is considered as the extent, to which a situation in definite country, region or industry is favorable for inflow of potential investments[1]. Sometimes, such synonyms of investment climate as "investment environment", "business climate", "business environment" and "rules of the game" are used. Despite the fact that those synonyms are somewhat incorrect, their usage in the context of public relations can generate tangible practical results influencing the volume of investments obtained by definite recipients.
In general, investment climate is viewed as conditions and factors determining economic environment[2]. As a matter of fact, there are short- and long-term aspects of business activities. Conditions important for short-term transactions and those crucial for long-term ones are basically different. For instance, to successfully execute contracts for the sale/purchase of consumer goods whose level of capital intensity is low, requirements to stability and predictability of business environment are limited to relatively short-term periods. The same is true in case of speculative stock market and foreign exchange transactions.
Should we study investments as purchase of basic assets, such as machinery, equipment, expenses for construction of buildings and premises, and not as purely financial exchange dealings[3], it will be obvious that requirements to stability and/or predictability of investment climate as well as behavior of potential recipients should be of a long-term nature. The above fundamentally alters approaches to assessment of the investment climate.
Investment climate is formed under the influence of different factors. Some academicians divide them into the following groups:
1) Natural: geographical location, natural conditions and resources
2) Economic: general economic trends (revival, decline, stagnation), taxes and tariffs, quality and cost of manpower, characteristics of banking system and other ingredients of economic infrastructure, dynamics of exports/imports transactions, currency exchange rate, inflation processes etc.
3) Political and legal: national legislation and general investment policy of a state, legal traditions and level of development of relevant infrastructure, mechanisms for and scales of state interference with economic development, continuity and consistency of state policy etc.
4) Social: sex-age structure of population, social psychology and traditions etc.[4]
The above factors differ from each other according to the level of their mobility/inertness. It is rather easy for investors to estimate factors that are inert or relatively stable from the viewpoint of investment activities, such as geographical location of a country or a region with respect to other centers of business activity, natural resources, sex-age structure and geographical distribution of population etc. The reason is that discovery of large deposits of natural resources whose exploitation is economically expedient (like gas and oil fields in the Caspian Sea region) is quite a rare phenomenon and events like transformation of the European political map, which took place in late XIX century, are absolutely unique. Within historical periods marked by identical epochal changes, it is extremely difficult to assess economic and, especially, political and legal factors because of their high mobility. Potential investors pay close attention to those factors, thereby making basic estimation of investment attractiveness of a state/region.
Assessment of investment climate is based on analyses of the majority of the above factors viewed as in parameters as well as capital inflow/outflow, dynamics of inflation tempo, interest rate, share of savings in the GDP regarded as out parameters[5]. Such estimate is predominantly of expert nature and therefore is somewhat subjective, which can be used in the above-mentioned public relations context. That is why authors usually briefly define investment climate as rather favorable or unfavorable without citing numerous statistical indicators and analytical conclusions.
The term "investment attractiveness of enterprise/company" provides for fewer opportunities for manipulation, since forecast of definite recipient's behavior and corresponding environmental changes are much more reliable. Nevertheless, even in this case, a paradoxical situation may take place. For example, the Russian Gazprom has large debts to western creditors, though its shares are very attractive for investors. This paradox can be rather simply explained by the fact that the Gazprom is the major supplier of natural gas to the European market and will apparently retain this position within the next 20 years. In Ukraine, the similar situation is observed in case of the Kyivenergo. Notwithstanding the company's debts, foreign investors are interested to participate in its privatization. Potential investors are also interested in a whole number of other Ukrainian enterprises even despite Ukraine's unfavorable investment climate.
Every investor expects to derive certain profit or other advantages. Hence, we would like to make an effort to estimate Ukraine's investment climate in the light of actual activity of both Ukrainian and foreign investors, considering the fact that they have different incentives to invest.

2. Foreign investments in Ukraine

Foreign businessmen have to accommodate to conditions of an unfamiliar country. In this context, they should be more cautious than local entrepreneurs, while objects of their investments should be more reliable from the viewpoint of business prospects. The best way to attain the above goal is choice of recipient enterprises that are well adapted to the situation on local or foreign markets. It is possible to assume that directions and volumes of foreign investments point to the most reliable and viable sectors of the national economy. Therefore, we would like to closely study foreign investments in Ukraine.
From the time the state declared its independence and committed itself to economic liberalization till January 1, 2001, the amount of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Ukraine totaled USD 3.9 billion. Analysis of FDI dynamics, structure, geographical origin and use allowed revealing the following tendencies. Foreign companies started actively investing in Ukraine's economy only in 1995, when the amount of FDI constituted USD 413.1 million as compared to USD 483.5 million within all previous years. Within next three years, dynamics of FDI inflow in Ukraine was positive, i.e. the level of FDI was increasing year-by-year. For instance, in 1996, 1997 and 1998, the amount of FDI surged by 31%, 51.4% and 80.8% respectively as compared to previous years. Subsequent to the 1998 world financial crisis, there was a sharp decrease in the volume of FDI, which only in 2000 was followed by improvement of the situation and growth of foreign investments inflow by nearly 24% as compared to 1999. The government expects that in 2001, the amount of FDI should increase by USD 900 million. Within recent years, FDI to GDP ratio varied within the limits of 1.24-2.5%, while in 2000, the share of FDI in the total amount of capital investments increased to 4.1%.
Foreign investments in Ukraine are mostly made in the form of monetary funds, movable property, real estate and securities. As far as the structure of foreign investments in Ukraine in 2000 is concerned, the share of monetary funds equaled 57.8%, movable property and real estate - 30.6%, securities - 6.2%, other types of assets - 5.4%.
The largest share of FDI in the amount of USD 2,755.8 million (or 71.3% of the total volume) was attracted by collective enterprises. Companies owned by foreign investors received FDI in the amount of USD 1,057.1 million USD (27.3%), whereas private, state and municipal enterprises attracted USD 25.8 million (0.7%), USD 17.7 million (0.5%) and USD 9.1 million (0.2%) of investments respectively.
Foreign companies are relatively stronger inclined to invest in joint ventures (JVs). By early 2001, overall number of JVs totaled 4,969, while the volume of FDI they had received constituted USD 2.3 billion. Average amount of FDI per enterprise equaled USD 457,000 and that per industrial enterprise constituted USD 980,000. In fuel industry the above indicator reached the level of USD 6,896,000; in food industry - USD 1,512,000; in machine building - USD 972,000; in consumer goods industry - USD 187,000; in agriculture - USD 331,000; and in trade and public catering - USD 147,000.
Foreign companies most willingly invest in food industry (USD 775.5 million or 20.1% of the total amount of investments), internal trade (USD 727.8 million or 18.8%) as well as machine building and metalworking industry (USD 347.6 million or 9%). Foreign investors are also interested in banking and insurance branches (USD 248.1 million or 6.4%) as well as in fuel industry (USD 227 million or 5.9%).

Table 1. Volume of FDI in Ukraine's Economy*

* The list of branches is not completeSource: the State Committee for Statistics

The lion's share of FDI (90.4%) comes to Ukraine from western countries. The rest of foreign investments (9.6%) are attracted from the CIS and Baltic States. The United States of America is the major investor in the Ukrainian economy (USD 635.8 million or 16.4% of the total amount) followed by Cyprus (USD 372.6 million or 9.6%), the Netherlands (USD 361.8 million or 9.4%), the Russian Federation (USD 299.4 million or 7.7%), Germany (USD 237.9 million or 6.2%), the Virgin Islands (Great Britain) (USD 176.8 million or 4.4%), Korea (USD 170.4 million or 4.4%) and Switzerland (USD 169.9 million or 4.4%). The share of those states approximates to 71% of the total amount of FDI attracted.
Western and Russian companies, two major groups of investors, have already determined their investment priorities. Representatives of western companies proceed from the fact that in countries of their location markets have been formed long ago and are stable, which makes it hardly possible to substantially increase profits[6]. Hence, first and foremost, they were interested in Ukraine as in the sales market offering opportunities to increase volumes of goods sold and services rendered. Therefore, foreign investors prefer such branches as food industry, agriculture, trade and distribution, i.e. spheres not requiring large amount of initial investments, having high capital turnover ratio, characterized by low risks taking advantage of Ukrainian market's demand. By the way, it takes USD 1,000,000 to open a McDonalds restaurant. Since 1997, the company has opened 44 restaurants and invested USD 70 million in Ukraine's economy. The company is going to invest another USD 7 million this year and plans to enlarge network of restaurants up to 85 by 2004[7]. Investments of the American Cargill Co. in Ukraine amount to USD 85 million. In 1995, the company built its first enterprise producing crossbred sunflower seeds; in 1997 it established a factory producing compound fertilizers; and in 2000 - a plant processing 300,000 tons of sunflower-seeds a year, which approximates to 10% of all Ukrainian capacities. The Sun Interbrew Co. worked up one thirds of the Ukrainian beer market, on investing USD 43.1 million in purchase and re-equipment of Ukrainian breweries, such as the Kharkiv-based Pogan brewery JSC, the Chernigiv-based Desna brewery JSC, the Mykolaiv-based Yantar brewery JSC and the Sevastopol-based Beer and non-alcoholic beverages factory JSC[8].
There is severe competition between foreign companies on the Ukrainian market for transportations and telecommunications. The Utel, Ukrainian-American-German-Dutch joint venture, has been operating in Ukraine since 1992. Within this period, the company made investments in the amount of around USD 200 million. This year, the Utel plans to invest USD 45 million in development of Ukraine's communications. Another joint venture, the Golden Telecom, has invested in Ukraine's economy USD 60 million and is expected to invest USD 21 million more in 2001.
Unlike western companies, Russian enterprises mostly invest in Ukraine's key industries, such as fuel and energy complex, metallurgy, machine building and metalworking, i.e. in branches allowing Russian investors to restore or maintain technological links that were formed in the former USSR. Within last two years, the Russian Lukoil Co. purchased a large block of shares of the Odessa oil refinery, founded a joint venture with the Kalush-based Oriana petrochemical plant and now is going to invest USD 37 million in its technical re-equipment. Besides, within 2001-2003, the company plans to invest nearly USD 300 million in construction of 150 filling stations and establish a retail trade network to increase sales of combusting-lubricating materials. The Tumen Oil Co., another Russian giant of oil business, purchased Ukraine's largest Lysychansk-based oil refinery. Russian entrepreneurs are also interested in Ukrainian aluminum industry. Last year, the Russian Aluminum holding privatized the Mykolaiv-based aluminium plant and the AvtoVAZ-Invest purchased controlling stockholding of the Zaporizzhya-based aluminous factory.
We should also mention recent tenders for controlling shareholdings of six "oblenergos". Experts estimate tenders results differently, though, they all agree that those results were adversely affected by recent political instability[9]. It is worthwhile to remark that while nobody has any doubts about the "authenticity" of the AES Washington Holdings B.V., whereas the Vychodoslovenske Energeticke Zavody Co. may have served as a cover for an influential Ukrainian businessman[10]. If the above is true, it means that only entrepreneurs directly or indirectly supported by power structures can carry on large-scale investment activities in today's Ukraine, which negatively characterizes the country's investment climate.

3. Changes in the investment process in Ukraine

To complete the picture we would like to analyze investment activities of Ukrainian entrepreneurs. From early 90s till the end of the recent world financial crisis, their investment activity was declining. Volume of capital investments allocated for creation or renewal of basic assets, such as machinery, equipment, buildings, premises and so on, decreased. Both public and shadow distribution of property within that period resulted in the fact that large amounts of assets were converted into money, which was transferred abroad, first of all, to offshore zones. Later on, those funds were returned to Ukraine as foreign investments. The above statistical data indicate that such famous offshore zones as Cyprus and the Virgin Islands are among major foreign investors. Actually, there is no certainty that all funds coming to the country from offshore zones are of Ukrainian origin. However, in the opinion of bankers, entrepreneurs, large trade intermediaries, officials and independent experts, Ukrainian origin of a considerable share of offshore capitals is beyond doubt.
The period preceding the 1998 crisis was remarkable for rapid growth of fictitious capital. Volumes of trade in domestic state bonds (DSB) were steadily increasing, as it was much more profitable to invest in DSB than in real assets. As a result, two relatively closed cycles "money-money" and "goods-goods" have been formed in Ukraine's economy. The DSB market, where banks and other financial institutions played the role of major purchasers, served as a basis for the first cycle. Many actual holders of DSB were foreigners. The majority of proceeds from trade in DSB were earmarked not for development of the real sector but for funding of state budget deficit. The second cycle was based on barter dealings and transactions with goods made on commission, which was evoked by lack of "live" money and numerous schemes of property redistribution. The period of 1995 - early 1998 was characterized by relatively low exchange rates of hard currencies, including U.S. dollar, and stable hryvnya. That is why imported commodities successfully competed with Ukrainian ones. All the afore-mentioned factors did not stimulate investments to the real sector of the Ukrainian economy on the part of domestic entrepreneurs. In Russia, the situation was almost identical, except for some national peculiarities mostly related to enormous reserves of natural resources.
The world financial crisis of 1997-1998 radically changed the situation. Its most important implications for Ukraine included frustration of illusions both in the country and abroad as well as abrupt devaluation of the national currency. Hryvnya devaluation drastically altered the correlation between revenues from imports and exports transactions in favor of the latter. As a result, Ukraine's investment climate started changing for the benefit of Ukrainian manufacturers.
The above conclusion is confirmed by official statistical data. For instance, industrial output in Ukraine increased by 4.3% in 1999 and by 12.9% in 2000. For the first time, capital investment growth took place in 1998. That year its rate constituted 5.7%, slowed down to 0.4% in 1999 because of the financial crisis and surged to 11.2% in 2000. According to the government report to the Verkhovna Rada, "last year's positive trend towards growth of capital investments intensified in the first quarter of this year. Within the reporting period, volume of capital investments increased by 23.7% as compared to 26.2% within the same period of 2000 and 11.2% within the whole last year. In January-March 2001, Ukrainian enterprises and organizations made capital investments in the amount of UAH 3.9 billion. Internal funds of enterprises remained the major source of capital investments equaling 67.6% of the total amount of investments". Within the first quarter of 2001, the share of investments funded from the state budget increased, constituting 5.3% of the total amount of investments compared to 3.5% within the same period of 2000[11].
Hryvnya devaluation and actual revaluation of US dollar in Ukraine, growth of population incomes and gradual accommodation of many market participants to new economic conditions enhanced competitiveness of Ukrainian commodities and weakened positions of imported goods in domestic market. The most favorable conditions for business activities are observed in processing industries, where manpower is the key production factor. Within January-March 2001, increase of output in extracting industry amounted to 3.3% compared to the same period of 2000, whereas that in processing industry totaled 23.8%. In food industry, including the branch processing agrarian produce, output grew by 27.4% as compared to the same period of 2000.
At the same time, despite the above positive tendencies, some negative factors retained their impact, thereby hindering shifts towards formation of a favorable investment climate in Ukraine in the long-term period. It is well known that development of commodity-money relations is the pledge of free movement of capitals, while reduction in the number of direct commodity exchange transactions encourages investments. In Ukraine, the share of barter trade was decreasing dramatically within last 3 years and reached the level of 9.6% in January-February 2001 as compared to 19.4% and 35.6% within the same period of 2000 and 1999 respectively. Nevertheless, innovation activity of Ukrainian enterprises remains rather stagnant, as within the first quarters of 2000 and 2001, only a small number of Ukrainian enterprises introduced innovations (6% and 5.6% respectively).
It would also be expedient to pay attention to special economic zones (SEZs) and territories of priority development (TPDs) established so that to accelerate economic development of a region and create new jobs by means of attraction of both foreign and domestic investors, formation of a more favorable investment climate offering incentives to business activity. Donetsk region ranks first in Ukraine according to the number of SEZs and TPDs. So, experience acquired in the region allows making preliminary conclusions about key issues relating to formation of a favorable investment climate in Ukraine.
In the opinion of Andriy Kluyev, deputy head of the Donetsk regional state administration, provision of preferential investment treatment, first and foremost, preferential taxation, to economic entities encouraged last year's tremendous growth of FDI in the region, four times exceeding indicators of all previous years in total. 116 investment programs in the amount of UAH 4.3 billion (USD 775 million) were approved prior to introduction of preferential investment treatment. Those programs envisaged that nearly 12 thousand new jobs would be created and 23.6 thousand people would retain their jobs. 77 programs are currently implemented in the region. The amount of UAH 1.6 billion (USD 290 million) or 63% of the total capital costs for projects has already been invested in the region.
Experience proves that in the Donetsk TPD investment programs are implemented unevenly. Towns where production is well diversified and, thereby, promotes inter-branch redistribution of manpower and financial resources, play the leading role in that process. For instance, in Donetsk, 40 programs requiring 296.3 million of investments have been approved, of which 29 projects in the amount of USD 146 million are at the implementation stage. In Horlovka, 15 investment programs worth USD 143.3 million have been endorsed, of which 10 projects in the amount of USD 52.7 million are now executed. By late 2000, 52% of planned funds were invested. 14 investment programs in Horlovka relate to development of the Stirol concern, one of the major Ukrainian exporters. In Mariupol, the total cost of 9 investment programs approved equals USD 88 million but only two projects at the Azovstal metallurgical plant worth USD 28 million are carried out at the moment. So far, investments attracted amount to USD 25 million. 7 investment projects, whose total cost equals USD 17.6 million, have been endorsed in Makiyvka.
In smaller towns where diversification of production processes is either low or totally absent, level of investment activity is not that high. For example, in Dobropol, just three investment projects worth USD 5.8 million were approved, in Artemivsk - two (USD 3.7 million) and in Dzerzhynsk - only one program (USD 6 million). Hence, geographical distribution of investment projects within Donetsk region clearly demonstrates cumulative impact of factors determining the extent, to which investment climate is favorable not only in the region or definite area but in Ukraine on the whole. Level of investment activity of economic entities is influenced by different local as well as regional social and economic conditions. It can considerably vary from area to area even regardless of the fact that the same legislation is applied and economic as well as natural factors are actually identical.
At the same time, opponents of SEZs and TPDs as mechanisms improving investment climate and encouraging investment process accentuate the fact that, for the time being, budget losses resulting from preferences granted to investors in SEZs and TPDs exceed budget proceeds from taxes and other mandatory payments. Since the establishment of the Donetsk TPD and till the end of 2000, the above budget proceeds and losses equaled UAH 227 and 278 million respectively. However, local officials assert that in 2000, the amount of budget receipts was UAH 8.4 million higher than that of budget spending[12].
Results of reforming Russia's taxation system also serve as confirmation of cumulative impact of factors determining formation of investment climate. On January 1, 2001, some taxes in Russia were abolished, while income and turnover taxes were reduced to 13% and 1% respectively. Though, the authors of changes in and amendments to the laws on taxation disregarded a number of essential branch and organizational aspects of the post-Soviet economy. For instance, as soon as the turnover tax was levied on service enterprises, they suffered heavy losses. According to some experts and businessmen, advantages the above enterprises had gained from decrease in the income tax are nullified by payments of the turnover tax even despite the fact that its rate dropped from 4% to 1%. Enterprises are also not interested to declare the total amount of their profit due to the absence of taxation amnesty. Many entrepreneurs complain about high social taxes. Nevertheless, inefficient management seems to be the key point[13].

4. Conclusions

Basic reasons for cautious attitude of foreign investors to Ukraine are well known and look as follows. At macro-level: general state of national economy, political, legal and economic instability and absence of transparent system for business activities. At micro-level: nature of relations between Ukrainian manufacturers, their foreign partners and sate organizations, lack of experience in the field of cooperation with foreign partners, neglect of respective standards and values because of the national mentality. Different approaches of Ukrainian and foreign entrepreneurs to organization of the investment process, ways and methods used to study the market study and carry on business hamper attraction of FDI to Ukraine. The situation is gradually changing for the better, though many problems remain unsettled. At the same time, foreign investors are potentially interested in Ukraine having great advantages over other CIS states, inclusive of beneficial geographical location (sea ports and location on European transport intersection), reserves of some important natural resources, developed technological potential, educated and comparatively cheap manpower as well as potentially capacious domestic market[14].
The majority of western investors successfully work in the sphere of consumer goods production and trade, where influence of political factors on investment climate is relatively lower. Strong foreign and Russian companies capable of overcoming political risks operate on markets for capital goods and those tending to oligopoly. As a matter of fact, behavior of foreign investors can serve as evidence of adaptation of Ukraine's economy to standard "rules of the game" in the world market and indicate the nature of its integration into the world economy. To estimate investment climate in Ukraine from the viewpoint of foreign investors it would be expedient to visualize future key directions of the Ukraine's economic orientation, whether it would be towards Western Europe, the CIS or other countries. Since nowadays this orientation is not clear, it is possible to speak only about more or less favorable climate of investing in certain industry.
At the same time, the decade of accommodation of Ukrainian society to market economic conditions encouraged growth of investments on the part of domestic entrepreneurs. Taking into account the afore-mentioned, we can state that at present, Ukrainian manufacturers enjoy more favorable investment climate than two years ago. As a matter of fact, investment environment differs from branch to branch. The analysis we carried out proves that investment climate is better in economic sectors having competitive advantages on domestic and foreign markets, i.e. in metallurgy, machine building, food and consumer goods industries, transportation services and communications. However, strong dependence of Ukraine's economy on foreign trade transactions due to relatively low purchasing power of domestic consumers deteriorates uncertainty related to assessment of business environment, adversely affecting investment climate in the country. On the other hand, a number of legal documents that can improve Ukraine's investment climate have been passed recently, such as the law of Ukraine "On Mutual Investment Institutions (Unit Trusts and Corporate Investment Funds)".

References:
1 Russia's Investment Climate. The Economic Issues. 1999. No. 12. P. 10.
2 D. Preyger, O. Nyzhnyk. Formation of Favorable Business Climate in Ukraine: the Role of the State and Entrepreneurs. The Economic Reform Today. 1999. No. 27. P. 30.
3 K. Mcconnel, S. Bru. Economics: Principles, Challenges and Policy. The Respublika. Moscow. 1992. P. 25.
4 Ukraine's Economy: Potential, Reforms, Prospects. Volume 2. Problems of Reforming Property Relations in Ukraine. Edited by V. Besedin, O. Rudchenko. Kyiv. The Scientific Research Institute for Economics at the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. 1996. P. 188-193.
5 V. Marchak. Dirty Deed of the Crisis. The Companion. 2001. No. 10. P. 17-18.
6 The Ukrainian Investment Paper. 2001. No. 7. P. 8-9.
7 The Biznes weekly. 2001. No. 18. P. 42-43.
8 The Kyivsky Telegraph. 2001. April 30-May 5. P. 12-13.
9 The Zerkalo Nedeli weekly. 2001. No. 17. P. 7.
10 The Uriadovyi Kurrier. 2001. April 19. P. 4-5.
11 The Delovoy Donbass. 2001. No. 1. P.8-9.
12 F.Svarovsky, D.Zhelvytsky. From Shadow to Light? The Vedomosti. 2001. April 23. P. 8.
вгору...

Investment and Innovation Policy of Ukrainian Government: Achievements and Drawbacks

By Olexandr Baranovsky, head of the analytical and methodical department of the Accounting Chamber, doctor of economics.

Under the circumstances of long-term social and economic crisis, Ukraine's investment sphere experienced the most terrible shock, which adversely affected capital investments (see table 1) [1].

Table 1. Capital Investments

Within 1991-1997, level of real capital investments was essentially decreasing year by year and only from 1998 the situation started to slowly stabilize. So, there are no grounds to state that investment crisis has been overcome. Moreover, within the last decade, the general trend was toward reduction of the capital investment to GDP ratio.
The situation in the innovation sphere looks almost the same (see table 2) [2].

Table 2. Key Indicators of Innovation Activity of Ukrainian Industrial Enterprises

Within 1994-2000, the number of Ukrainian enterprises actively developing innovations considerably dropped. Their share in the overall number of industrial enterprises decreased nearly twice. Only in 2000, indicator of developed innovations approximated to that in 1993. In 1999, the number of new production processes introduced at Ukrainian industrial enterprises reduced three times, while that of waste-free and resource-saving technologies declined more than twice. Thus, innovations played minor role in economic development.
The Reforms for Well-Being Program of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine provided for the following objectives in the sphere of investment and innovation policy:
To increase the level of investment resources and the share of investments in the GDP
To create additional investment resources to finance national economy by means of growth in real incomes, introduction of mechanisms for accumulation of population's savings and legal regulation of protection of citizen savings
To promote inflow of foreign investments
To renew state investment activity, to ensure priority allocation of investment resources for development of infrastructure and encouragement of scientific and technological as well as innovation policy
To introduce a mechanism for mixed funding of enterprises oriented to highly efficient investment and innovation programs
To focus innovation policy on maintenance and promotion of scientific and technological advance, development of high technology processes, technological renewal of production
In 2000, some of the above objectives of investment and innovation policy were successfully attained. According to the State Committee for Statistics, last year, capital investment growth ratio equaled 11.2% as compared to 0.4% in 1999 and 6.1% in 1998. In compliance with the report of the CIS Intergovernmental Committee for Statistics, in 2000, increase of the level of capital investments within the CIS states averaged 15% as compared to 1999. The above indicator amounted to 29% in Kazakhstan, equaled 26% in Armenia and constituted 18% in Russia. Ukraine ranked fourth. At the same time, capital investment growth ratio increased only by 4% in Kirgizstan, by 2% - in Azerbaijan and Georgia, by 1% - in Moldova and by 0.7% - in Uzbekistan, whereas in Belarus, this figure decreased by 3%.
Last year, the amount of capital investments equaled nearly UAH 19.5 billion earmarked from all possible sources of funding. Within 2000, structure of the sources of capital investments experienced changes. Internal investment resources of enterprises constituted over two thirds of the total number of capital investments. State budget's shares in capital investments and in housing construction dropped by 1.5% and 0.5%, equaling 6.1% and 5.8% of the overall amount of capital investments respectively. Capital investments funded from local budgets increased by 0.6% and constituted 4.5% of their total amount, while the share of foreign investments amounted to 4.1%. As for the share of extra-budget sources of capital investments in other CIS states, it equaled 97% in Azerbaijan, 92% - in Kazakhstan and Moldova, 91% - in Georgia, 90% - in Kirgizstan, 82% - in Armenia, 78% - in Belarus and 71% - in Uzbekistan. Capital investments funded from internal sources of enterprises and organizations equaled 29% of the overall amount in Azerbaijan, 34% - in Armenia, 47% - in Belarus, 31% - in Georgia, 61% - in Kazakhstan, 27% - in Kirgizstan and 68% - in Moldova. At the same time, in the CIS countries considerable capital investments were made by foreign companies and joint ventures whose share constituted 25% in Armenia, 4% - in Belarus, 34% - in Georgia, 30% - in Kazakhstan, 52% - in Kirgizstan and 18% - in Moldova.
Last year's growth of capital investments in the Ukrainian industrial sector is a very positive fact. Capital investments growth ratio in the industrial sector totaled 25.2%, whereas general indicator amounted to only 11.2%. It is worthwhile to emphasize that the above increase was observed after the 2.2% reduction in 1998 and minor growth of 0.9% in 1998. Amount of capital investments increased in such branches as forestry, transport and communications, construction industries, public catering, logistics, housing construction and health protection. In 2000, 45.1% of all capital investments were made in the industrial sector compared to 16.8% - in transport and communications as well as housing construction and 3.3% - in agriculture.
Nevertheless, such capital investments are not sufficient to solve topical problems. Moreover, the situation in the investment sphere is nearly critical. Last year, renewal of fixed production assets ratio constituted only 2.4% compared to 5.9% in 1995, whereas depreciation of basic assets amounted to 42.8% and was 5.7% higher than in 1995. In industry, depreciation was even higher and equaled 50.1% compared to 43.6% in 1995.
The amount of capital investments in construction of social infrastructure units constituted around UAH 4.8 billion or 24.5% of the total amount of capital investments in Ukraine. Housing construction remained priority direction of capital investments in the social sphere. Last year, 60.3 thousand apartments were built. In this sphere investments increased in Ternopil (33.4%), Dnipropetrovsk (11.7%), Kherson (8.7%), Lviv (6.4%) and Chernivtsi (5.4%) regions as well as in Kyiv (16.8%).
Growth of capital investments took place in the majority of Ukraine's regions. In Ukraine, average indicator of capital investment growth amounted to 11.2%, whereas it equaled 61.3% in the city of Sevastopol, 53.7% - in Ivano-Frankivsk, 40.6% - in Odessa and 40.1% - in Kharkiv regions.
The share of capital investments in units of production purpose remained the same (approximately three fourths of the total number). The share of capital investments in housing construction and construction of social-and-recreational buildings constituted 28.2%.
According the State Committee for Statistics, the trend towards increasing volumes of capital investments in both state and communal spheres remained stable (see table 3). In 20 regions of Ukraine, the amount of capital investments in 2000 exceeded that in 1999.

Table 3. Capital Investments by Forms of Ownership (% to the previous year)

The above factor entailed a 51.2% minor increase of the share of capital investments in the state sphere simultaneously with a 48.8% decrease of that in the private sector. Public sector's share in capital investments varied from 14.7% in Chernigiv region to 75.5% in Rivne region.
The share of capital investments in the GDP also reduced last year and equaled just 11.1%, whereas in 1998 and 1999 this figure amounted to 13.6% and 13.5% respectively.
Level of capital investments in agriculture, communications, information and computer technologies, education, culture, art and science went on decreasing.
In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytsk, Cherkasy and Chernivtsi regions, the amount of capital investments went down.
The issue of attraction of foreign direct investments (FDI) also leaves much to be desired (see table 4) [3].

Table 4. Foreign Direct Investments in Ukraine
(UAH million)

By January 1, 2001, the amount of FDI in Ukraine totaled USD 3,865.5 million. In 2000, volume of FDI increased by USD 583.7 million, which was USD 113.7 million or 23.9% up from the previous year. Foreign companies and individuals invested in Ukraine USD 792.2 million or 5% more as compared to the previous year.
The most attractive spheres for foreign investments were food industry - USD 775 million (20.1% of the total amount of FDI), home trade - USD 727.8 million (18.8%), machine building and metal-working industry - USD 347.6 million (9%), banking and insurance - USD 248.1 million (6.4%) and fuel industry - USD 227 million (5.9%).
In 2000, the amount of FDI increased in the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian regions. However, it insignificantly reduced in Zhytomyr, Rivne and Cherkasy regions as well as in the city of Sevastopol.
Geographical concentration of FDI did not change. Two thirds of foreign investments are concentrated in the city of Kyiv (36.1% of the total amount of FDI in Ukraine), Kyiv (8.8%), Donetsk (7.9%), Zaporizzhya (5.7%), Poltava (5.5%), Odessa (5.4%) and Dnipropetrovsk (4.8%) regions.
Last year, the lion's share of FDI in the Kyiv economy in the amount of USD 163 million came from developed market economies and offshore zones. In particular, West European states made 65% of the total amount of FDI, the United States of America - 27% and East European countries - 4.7%. The share of capital investments of the CIS, Asian and other states was rather small and constituted just 4%.
In 2000, major investors in Kyiv were the McDonalds Co. (USD 23.4 million) and the Billa - Ukraina Co. (around USD 9.3 million). The most attractive investment spheres in Kyiv are trade, banking, construction and communications.
In Ukraine, average amount of foreign investments per capita equals only USD 78, which is much less than in East European transition economies.
FDI growth in the amount of USD 700 million expected by the government was not achieved last year, as in the fourth quarter of 2000 a positive tendency to increase of FDI amount was substituted by a negative one. Though, FDI outflow did not exceed their inflow by far. Such a situation was caused not only by political and legal factors but also by the low level of solvent demand, decline of domestic market, absence of developed system of investment insurance, underdeveloped banking sector, stock market and communications infrastructure. The share of domestic market in the GDP declined from 74% in 1993 to 40% in 2000. Last year, the share of exported produce of wood processing industry amounted to 75%, ferrous metallurgy - 84% and chemical industry - 90%. The above indicates excessively high dependence of the national economy on the situation in foreign markets, which cannot but tell upon its stability and reliability.
Within 2000, special attention was paid to development of special economic zones (SEZs) and territories of priority development (TPDs). A number of legal documents were adopted, such as the August 3, 2000 Cabinet resolutions No. 1205 "On Approval of Procedure for Consideration and Endorsement of Investment Programs Implemented in Priority Spheres of Economic Activity in the Territories of Priority Development in Zhytomyr Region" and No. 1206 "On Approval of Procedure for Consideration and Endorsement of Investment Programs Implemented in Priority Spheres of Economic Activity in the Territories of Priority Development in Chernigiv Region"; the July 26, 2000 Cabinet resolution No. 1175 "On Some Aspects of Investment Activity within the Territories of Priority Development and Special Economic Zones"; the December 28, 2000 Cabinet resolution on introduction of changes and amendments to resolution No. 1175 approving the list of priority economic activities within the Zhytomyr and Chernigiv TPDs and TPD of the city of Shostka in Sumy region as well as within the Mykolaiv SES; the August 21, 2000 Cabinet resolution No. 1294 "On Approval of Procedure for Consideration and Endorsement of Investment Programs Implemented in Priority Spheres of Economic Activity within the Territories of Priority Development in the City of Kharkiv"; the October 4, 2000 Cabinet resolution No. 1507 "On Procedure for Consideration and Approval of Investment Programs Implemented within Tourist and Recreation Special Economic Zones Like the Truskavets Recreation SEZ"; the October 12, 2000 Cabinet resolution No. 1552 "On Approval of Procedure for Consideration and Endorsement of Investment Programs Implemented in Priority Spheres of Economic Activity on the Territory of the City of Shostka in Sumy region". On April 14, 2000 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine passed the decree No. 185-p and approved the list of priority spheres of economic activity and the procedure for approval of investment programs implemented in priority spheres of economic activity within TPDs of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. On December 20, 2000, the Cabinet adopted the decree No. 503-p "On Investment Programs Implemented in the Syvash North Crimean Experimental Economic Zone". The above legal documents were designed to regulate the process of investment programs practice within SEZs and in TPDs.
According to data of presidential administration's economic policy department, in 2000, growth rate of proceeds to the budgets of SEZs and TPDs due to investments was two times higher than that of budget losses resulting from preferences granted. Formation of special economic zones and territories has already generated positive effect and there are grounds to hope for much better results, for investment processes within those zones and territories continue intensifying. For instance, last year, within the territories of SEZs and TPDs, industrial output amounted to UAH 2.4 billion or was about three times higher as compared to the total of all preceding years of their functioning. In spite of the fact that the above zones and territories have existed for quite short terms, more active investment processes have already produced such tangible positive results as creation of new jobs, increase of industrial output, introduction of advanced technologies and effective management. Within the period of functioning of SEZs and TPDs, 369 investment programs in the amount of USD 1.5 billion were approved, of which over one forth (USD 429 million) have already been implemented. Around one half of invested funds came from abroad, which indicates increasing interest of foreign states in Ukraine's economy. Over 12 thousand new jobs were created and 29 thousand people retained their jobs within SEZs and TPDs due to attraction of private investments, which saved dozens of million hryvnyas of budget funds that otherwise should have been allocated for unemployment benefits.
According to data of the presidential administration's economic policy department, the TPD located in Donetsk region achieved the best results. In 2000, the amount of investments attracted in this territory equaled USD 317 million and 56 investment projects were approved. One half of the projects are implemented in metallurgy, machine building, coal and chemical industries. By October 2000, average monthly amount of wages in the TPD constituted UAH 516 and was twice higher than that in the region on the whole. The TPD located in Zakarpattya region ranked second. Within two years, inflow of investments in the TPD exceeded USD 37 million, over 5 thousand people retained their jobs and 2.6 thousand new jobs were created, while volume of sales constituted over UAH 130 million (80% of produce was exported).
However, the presidential administration's economic policy department estimated that the government and local executive bodies did not take full advantage of opportunities for increase of investments attracted in SEZs and TPDs. For instance, volume of foreign investments in SEZs and TPDs makes up only 10% of the total amount of FDI attracted in Ukraine since the time of establishment of those zones and territories. There are also such drawbacks as uneven distribution of investments between regions, imperfect and instable legislation. As a matter of fact, almost 95% of the total amount of investments are concentrated in TPDs located in Donetsk, Luhansk and Zakarpattya regions, the Yavoriv SEZ based in Lviv region and the Syvash North Crimean experimental economic zone. At the same time, minor investments are attracted in the Truskavets, the Slavutych, the Zakarpattya and the Donetsk SEZs as well as in the TPDs based in Volyn, Zhytomyr, and Chernigiv regions. Sometimes, valid legislation provides for opportunities for preferential investment of budget funds and import of products not related to implementation of investment projects. Procedure for calculation of non-taxable profit from realization of investment programs is also extremely complicated.
Officials of the presidential administration's economic policy department deem that further development of SEZs and TPDs should be focused on their transformation into the so-called "places of growth" offering a strong incentive to development of the national economy. The government and local executive bodies at all levels have to concentrate their work on attraction of investors, creation of favorable investment climate, improvement of legal basis, increase of investments in depressed regions and wider application of experience acquired within the most successful zones and territories. At the same time, operating efficiency of SEZs and TPDs is eroding because investors are not sure that those zones and territories will function as long as envisaged.
Development of the stock market will promote creation of additional investment resources for the national economy. According to the State Stock Market and Securities Commission (SSMSC), in 2000, volume of securities transactions in the secondary market amounted to UAH 39.2 billion or 22.4% of the GDP and 2.3 times exceeded the level of 1999. It would be expedient to mention that increase in volume of trade in securities was not attended with inflow of foreign investments. Structure of trade in securities looked as follows. The share of bills was the largest and they made up 55% of the turnover compared to 70% in 1999, stocks - 26% (around 16%), domestic state bonds and savings certificates - 7.5% and 6.5% respectively. Such imperfect structure undermines investment potential of Ukraine's stock market and hampers its integration into international ones.
The share of commercial banks on the stock market went down from 61% in 1999 to 43% in 2000, whereas that of securities traders and investment companies increased from 30% to 37.3% and from 8.7% to 18.7% respectively.
According to the SSMSC, the share of commercial transactions totaled 53%, while that of commission ones equaled 46%.
In 2000, volume of trade in securities in Ukraine's organized market amounted to UAH 2.8 billion or was 48.5% up from 1999. Though, the share of the organized market reduced from 11.3% to 7.2%.
In 2000, volumes of securities primary placement through stock exchanges and trading systems surged about 2.2 times (up to UAH 796 million) due to increase in stock proposal on the part of the State Property Fund in the process of privatization. At the same time, a number of companies made efforts of initial securities placements not related to privatization. For instance, the Andryivsky investment fund, the Pivdenny stock commercial bank, the Vinnifruit, the Autoalliance-XXI Century and the Ukrainsky Finansovy Portal public stock companies placed their securities in the amount of UAH 67.2 million through the First Securities Trading System.
By January 1, 2001, the Ukrainian stock market incorporated 858 securities traders, 357 registrars, 84 custodians, 1 depository institution, 7 stock exchanges, 2 information and trading systems as well as 10 self-regulation organizations.
At present, there are 252 investment funds in Ukraine, of which only three are open-end and the rest are closed-end. It is necessary to pass the law of Ukraine "On Mutual Investment Institutions (Unit Trusts and Corporate Investment Funds)" so that to build effective and transparent system of mutual investments and prevent abuse practices in the stock market.
Accumulation of population incomes should facilitate investments. In compliance with the State Committee for Statistics, real incomes of Ukrainian population surged by 6.3% in 2000. Within 2000, population deposited and invested in securities the amount of UAH 5,240 million that was UAH 684 million or 15% up from 1999. Growth of population cash savings amounted to UAH 3.2 billion, 1.3 times exceeding the level of 1999, which under appropriate circumstances could substantially increase overall volume of investment resources. However, the government did not take full advantage of opportunities relating to accumulation of population incomes. For example, it failed to enact a draft providing for full (and not limited to the equivalent of UAH 1,000) compensation for damage that could be incurred by depositors in case of bank's bankruptcy.
In its report on Ukraine's investment climate made on request of the Swedish government, the European Business Association stressed that Ukraine was in dire need to restrict state interference with private business activities, enhance consistency, stability and homogeneity of application of legislation for all market participants.
According to data of the State Committee for Statistics, in 2000, there was a trend towards revival of innovation activities in the industrial sector. Within that year, the number of enterprises that introduced innovations grew by 115 or by 8.4%. Innovations were most actively introduced in the branches of priority development. Every second aircraft factory, every third enterprise of shipbuilding, chemical and petroleum engineering, pharmaceutical, glass, china and faience industries, as well as every fourth tractor- and farm-building, electrical and ferrous metallurgy enterprise introduced innovations. Innovation activity also intensified at enterprises manufacturing electronics, motor vehicles, consumer goods, sanitary ware and gas equipment.
In 2000, the number of enterprises developing and producing fundamentally new equipment, gear and appliances increased by 5.5% and 18.5% as compared to 1999 and 1998 respectively. The share of such companies in the overall number of machine-building enterprises amounted to 8.1%, while in 1999 and 1998 it equaled 7.9% and 7.5% respectively. It took around 1.5 years to develop new equipment and produce pilot models, whereas in 1999 this term averaged 1.8 years. In 2000, enterprises introduced into production processes over 60% of innovations. Though, performance characteristics of most equipment were not fundamentally new and the share of new equipment whose development involved revolutionary innovative approaches was less than 4% as compared to 8.3% in 1999.
Positive tendency towards growing number of new products intensified. In 2000, the number of new types of equipment, gear and appliances rose by over 30% as compared to 1999. The afore-mentioned trend was observed in machine building for the needs of chemical and petroleum industries, highway construction and municipal enterprises. Number of new products increased by 21.2% compared to 17.1% and 4% in 1999 and 1998 respectively. The number of introduced advanced production processes surged by 16.6%, whereas it had been falling year-by-year within the period of 1992-1999.
Every third innovation in machine building was manufactured under purchased licenses. Industrial output produced under licenses amounted to 35.3% of the total volume of innovation produce.
Certain success was achieved in introduction of waste-free and resource-saving technologies. For the first time since 1992, their number insignificantly grew by 1.7%. At the same time, in Ukraine, mechanisms for implementation and funding of energy efficient programs are absent and the Extra-Budget Energy-Saving Fund is abolished.
Despite the fact that the number of Ukrainian enterprises actively applying innovations increased by 1.3% and reached the level of 14.8%, their share is rather small, especially from the viewpoint of high depreciation of their basic assets.
It would be expedient to pay attention to rather low level of innovation activities at enterprises of non-ferrous metallurgy, power, flour-and-cereals as well as building materials industries. In the regional aspect, enterprises of Odessa, Kirovohrad and Zakarpattya regions and in the city of Sevastopol introduced fewer mechanized workshops, robots, flexible production systems and modules as compared to the previous year.
So, not all available resources were used to enhance innovation activity of Ukrainian industrial enterprises.

References:
1 Message of Ukrainian president to the Verkhovna Rada on domestic and foreign affairs of Ukraine in 2000. Kyiv. Information-Publishing Center of the Ukrainian State Committee for Statistics. 2001. P.253.
2 The same source. P.331.
3 The same source. P.319.
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Reform Practice

National Program on Promotion of Ukraine's Small Business in the System of State Support for Small Business

By Ksenia Lyapina, counselor to Ukrainian Prime Minister, and Dmytro Lyapin, vice-president of the Institute for Competitive Society

Development of small business plays a special role in transition economies. This role is determined by economic, social and political functions of small business.
It is development of small business that can promote realization of the key goal, i.e. achievement of higher living standards in Ukraine through involvement of broad strata of population in business activity. Hence, it is possible to outline the following socially important targets of small business:
Creation of new jobs without additional funding on the part of the state
Attraction of population savings and shadow capital to the legal economy
Formation of competitive business environment
Stability of medium class
The need for development of small business has been recognized and its importance has been declared all the time since the disintegration of the USSR, though, for the time being, development of small business is not satisfactory.
For instance, dynamics of the number of small enterprises (SEs) per 1,000 people tends to grow (see chart 1). However, comparative analysis of the above indicator with those of advanced economies demonstrates wide gap (10-20 times) in development of small business in Ukraine (see chart 2).

System of state support for small business is very important for business development. Throughout Ukraine's independence, this system has been experiencing numerous changes simultaneously with transformations of business environment.
Formulation of state policy supporting small business in Ukraine was initiated in 1991. On February 7, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada passed the law "On Entrepreneurship" at its 3rd session and in May 1991, the State Committee for Support to Small Enterprises and Small Business was founded. In March 1993, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the State Support for Ukraine's Business. In his October 11, 1994 report to the Verkhovna Rada "On Key Tools of Economic and Social Policy", president of Ukraine set primary objectives of state policy geared toward comprehensive development of entrepreneurship, small and medium business. The 1995 annual presidential report to the Verkhovna Rada formulated major targets of state policy relating to development of private sector, first and foremost, medium and small business.
On March 1, 1991, the law of Ukraine "On Entrepreneurship" was enacted and development of private business was formally launched.
As a rule, in developed economies special laws on development of entrepreneurship are absent. Constitutions, civic law and other legal documents regulate economic activity.
Like in other post-socialist countries, in Ukraine, the special law on entrepreneurship was adopted because of the necessity to remove legal barriers hampering entrepreneurship on the one hand, as private business had been viewed as a criminal offence under the former USSR, and the need to offer incentives to business and private initiative on the other. It was the law "On Entrepreneurship" that introduced legal, economic, and social principles, established business conditions and legislative fundamentals of state regulation of and support for entrepreneurship as well as relations between the state and economic entities.
The March 1993 Cabinet Program was designed to implement state policy of support for development of business, inclusive of small one. The Policy was viewed as an integral part of comprehensive measures for encouragement of market relations in the state, overcoming the economic crisis and integration of Ukraine into the world economy. Major steps focused on stimulation of development of small business were taken according to the Comprehensive Plan of realization of the Program. However, such plans were approved only in 1993 and 1994 and have not been elaborated ever since.
The above Program was basically aimed at implementation of state policy in the sphere of support for and protection of entrepreneurship, creation of legal, organizational and economic conditions for its development, elaboration of mechanism for state regulation and coordination of business. The Program complied with the essence of entrepreneurship of those times and therefore was formulated as entirely paternalistic, i.e. state authorities were going to regulate and coordinate entrepreneurship like under the command economy. Notwithstanding its drawbacks, the Program contributed to elaboration and introduction of a new legal basis adequate to requirements for development of entrepreneurship.
In 1996, Ukraine entered the second stage of the state policy supporting small business. The April 1996 Cabinet resolution approving the State Policy Concept of Small Business Development, the June 28, 1996 constitutional legalization of freedom of entrepreneurship and the January 1997 Cabinet Program for Small Business Development in Ukraine within 1997-1998 initiated a new phase of the state policy in the sphere of entrepreneurship.
On April 3, 1996, the Cabinet approved the resolution No. 404 on the State Policy Concept of Small Business Development reading that state policy of small business development determining the guidelines, directions and forms of economic, administrative and legal influence is part and parcel of general social and economic policy of Ukraine.
On January 29, 1997, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the resolution No. 86 on the Program for Small Business Development in Ukraine within 1997-1998. The document was elaborated by the Ministry of Economy in compliance with the Concept and served as a mechanism supporting small business and designed to solve numerous problems related to its development. This resolution was focused on maintenance of stable development of small business as an integral part of the market economy and highlighted the key social role of small business, namely creation of new jobs without additional funding from the state budget. The Program emphasized that state measures should be based on principles of market economy; SEs should do without any government support; and the state should provide conditions for fair competition, granting preferences to small business.
System of measures envisaged in the Program incorporated the following sections:
1. Formation of legal basis regulating small business
2. Banking support for small business
3. Logistic and innovation support for small enterprises
4. Manpower policy, scientific and methodological basis for development of small business
5. Organizational basis, international financial and technical assistance in the sphere of small entrepreneurship

Conceptual section describing Program guidelines was very important despite some paternalistic overtones. State authorities did not lose their interest in centralization of support and distribution, especially, of international financial assistance.
Unfortunately, major steps in each of the directions of the State Support Program were formulated in such a vague and nontransparent manner that it was hardly possible to understand what they meant. For example, one of the most important directions was reading, "presentation of proposals to enhance effectiveness of taxation of small business entities". It would be expedient to mention that "presentation of proposals" is not a decision, while "enhancement of effectiveness" does not imply reduction of tax burden and can be interpreted by businessmen and state officials in different ways. So, assessment of execution of those measures was merely of expert nature and did not involve any quantitative analysis.
Further realization of the Program demonstrated that the legal basis was the sphere where major success was achieved. Notwithstanding a very cautious and inert formulation "presentation of proposals to enhance effectiveness of taxation of small business entities", it was the taxation system of small business entities that experienced the most drastic changes. In early 1998, key legal documents were passed, establishing three fundamentally new methods of the simplified taxation, such as the fixed tax imposed by the February 13, 1998 law of Ukraine "On Making Changes to the Cabinet Decree "On Income Tax"; special license to trade introduced by the February 10, 1998 law of Ukraine "On Making Changes to the Law of Ukraine "On Licensing of Some Business Activities"; and the single tax imposed by the July 3, 1998 presidential decree No. 727 "On the Simplified System of Accounting, Financial Statement and Taxation of Small Business Entities". The above taxation methods were approved under the influence of business environment and entailed increasing growth of the number of SEs since 1998.
In 1998, legal basis for regulatory policy as a method stimulating development of entrepreneurship started to form. The State Committee for Entrepreneurship Development was established as a national executive authority. The same year, the February 3, 1998 presidential decree No. 79/98 "On Removal of Barriers to Development of Entrepreneurship", the May 12, 1998 presidential decree No. 456/98 "On State Support for Small Business" and the July 23, 1998 presidential decree No. 817/98 "On Some Measures Deregulating Business" were elaborated and adopted.
All the afore-mentioned took place due to activity of the newly formed national executive body and requirements of business environment and was not envisaged in the Program for Small Business Development in Ukraine within 1997-1998. Hence, the Program proved to be inefficient as a mechanism designed to consolidate efforts of different state authorities for implementation of small business development policy.
The third stage of state policy supporting small business actually began in 1998. Its distinctive features were recognition, at the state level, of the need to reduce state interference with business, refusal of state paternalism and formation of business environment favorable for development of free entrepreneurship by means of removal of administrative bureaucratic barriers.
Adoption of the October 19, 2000 law of Ukraine No. 2063-III "On State Support for Small Business" and the December 21, 2000 law No. 2157-III "On National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine" contributed to further development of state policy in the sphere of small business support and, probably, marked the beginning of its new stage.
For the first time in Ukraine's history, the law "On State Support for Small Business" read, "legal principles of state support for small business entities of all forms of ownership are aimed at overcoming the crisis as soon as possible and offer better opportunities for introduction of market reforms in Ukraine". In other words, small business was recognized as the key factor influencing market reforms. The law also described the role of small business development programs reading, "The National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine is a package plan geared toward realization of the state policy related to solving problems of small business".
So, the National Program obviously plays the role of a mechanism consolidating efforts of state authorities, local government bodies, associations of entrepreneurs, business incubators, business centers, consulting, leasing and other companies for implementation of small business development policy. It is very significant that the Program based on such principles and such policy encouraging small business can actually become national.
The law "On State Support for Small Business" governed, "presenting the Verkhovna Rada with Ukraine's state budget draft, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should annually inform the parliament about implementation of the National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine and substantiate the amount of funds allocated for realization of the Program in the next budget year, indicating sources of financing. Selection of projects to be implemented within the frameworks of the National Program should be conducted on competitive basis according to respective resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine".
Proceeding from the afore-mentioned, it is possible to make a conclusion that from now on, there is an opportunity to control facts and figures relating to execution of measures for the previous period and make proposals relating to the next term. There is also a real opportunity to introduce small business support and development programs jointly funded by state and local authorities. Non-governmental organizations, such as business associations and think tanks focused on development of entrepreneurship, can compete for funds envisaged by the above projects. This is the efficient way to consolidate joint efforts and find ingenious solutions to development of entrepreneurship.
The law "On National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine" consists of two sections. The first, conceptual one, determines stage of development of small business in Ukraine prior to execution of the National Program, formulates the Program's goal as "creation of adequate conditions to realize the constitutional right to carry on business and increase welfare of Ukrainian population through involvement of broad strata of population in such activity", and outlines the Program guidelines and objectives.
Major directions of the National Program are as follows:
Improve legal basis in the sphere of small business
Establish the single state policy regulating small business
Revive financial and investment support for small business
Facilitate creation of infrastructure required for development of entrepreneurship
Introduce regional policy stimulating development of small business
It is important that in the long run, the role of state regulatory policy was determined legally. The above law reads, "Measures for introduction of the state regulatory policy are focused on ensuring consistent and well-coordinated steps for elaboration and enactment of regulatory documents as well as considering public proposals in the process of their development. Those measures are geared toward formation of optimum state regulation of activity of small business entities". Unlike in the previous analogous legal acts, in the National Program special attention was paid to infrastructure necessary to develop small business and consolidate efforts in the sphere of regional policy. In general, the conceptual section of the Program is well-grounded and complies with requirements of business environment.
It is much more difficult to evaluate measures of the National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine for 2001 indicated in the second section. It is too early to analyze their implementation on the one hand and almost impossible to estimate results on the other, for some of those steps were formulated rather vaguely. Despite the fact that the task relating to formation of legal basis has been performed, there are a number of drawbacks. For example, the most topical and necessary for development of small business section of the Program dealing with formation of the state regulatory policy is formulated as an eternal process, which can hardly be estimated. The above is a serious drawback, especially, taking into account the fact that taxes paid by small business entities form substantial share of budget revenues. So, effectiveness of the National Program and predictability of its results are integral parts of the state policy, since in such a manner the state can gradually win the population's confidence. The same is true about other objectives, most of which are set in the form of eternal process guided by the State Committee for Entrepreneurship Development (SCED). Therefore, those objectives are rather functions of the SCED than clearly defined program measures and it is safe to suggest that analysis of the Program's implementation will virtually imply that of the SCED's work.
The program for 2002 should incorporate changes designed to eliminate such a situation.
The Institute for Competitive Society carries out the Project "Ongoing Efforts to Enhance Influence of Business Organizations on Economic Reform: Participation in Elaboration and Realization of the Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine". Within the frameworks of this Project, a session of the Institute for Competitive Society Task Force was held with the assistance of representatives of regional business associations. Participants shared their viewpoints on programs of small business development and expressed expectations relating to measures envisaged in the National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine for 2002. In their opinion, those measures should comply with the following requirements:
Each measure provides for achievement of a certain definable and measurable result
Closer attention is paid to realization of targets envisaged in concrete programs, especially regional ones, and more active involvement of state authorities and non-governmental organizations
A system of control allows implementation of the Program to be reported during a year
Such a system ensures control not only over budget expenditures but also over efficiency of measures and their impact on business environment
Procedure for realization of the Program is transparent and access to information is free at all stages
The following objectives are set:
1.To introduce a regulatory reform relating to free access to draft resolutions of local authorities and involve population in discussion of such drafts
2.To develop a system of financial support for SEs
3.To form infrastructure that encourages development of entrepreneurship with due regard to structures providing information on newly established economic entities and on premises available
4.To improve legal basis of entrepreneurship
Measures envisaged in the National Program Stimulating Development of Small Business in Ukraine for 2002 should contribute to consolidation of efforts of both state authorities and NGOs as well as realization of comprehensive and consistent state policy supporting development of small business in Ukraine.
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Research

Investment Attractiveness Rating of Ukrainian Regions

By Olexandr Olijnyk and Markiyan Datsyshyn, experts at the Institute for Reforms

It is generally recognized that Ukraine's investment climate is unfavorable as compared to Central and Eastern European countries. Ukraine is an outsider almost in all authoritative international ratings. Its dynamics of foreign investments indicates still high level of risk for foreign companies in the Ukrainian market. At the same time, conditions for investment activities within the country essentially differ from region to region. There are examples when companies curbed their activities in some regions and simultaneously expanded them in others.
What is the real investment potential of Ukrainian regions? Experts of the Institute for Reforms, a Ukrainian analytical center, have long been studying the above issue. Recent results of research in this sphere served as a basis for making up investment attractiveness rating of Ukrainian regions. We have the pleasure of bringing this rating to your attention.
At first sight, there are doubts about practical expediency of analysis of investment climate in regions when valid legislation is far from being perfect and policy pursued by central authorities in the investment sphere is inconsistent. Moreover, in the unitary state, local authorities officially are not vested with enough powers to strongly influence economic processes in the regions. Sharing to certain extent the above and other possible opinions, we would like to remark that there are convincing arguments for the regional approach, including statistical ones. Within last several years, the largest amount of foreign direct investments (FDI) was made in enterprises of food industry and home trade, i.e. in the spheres evenly represented in the structures of Ukrainian regional economies. Hence, there are grounds to discuss regional competition for investment resources. Comparative competitiveness analysis with respect to each of 24 Ukrainian regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Kyiv was carried out within the frameworks of the above approach.
Information basis for research was formed according to results of polling managers who work in most Ukrainian regions, experts of investment companies and business associations as well as independent experts. Hence, determining indicators of investment attractiveness of Ukrainian regions we considered the most important factors in the decision-making process. Classification was made following such criteria as level of regional economic development, market and financial regional infrastructure, human resources and activity of local authorities in the business sphere.
Indicators of investment attractiveness ratings of Ukrainian regions were calculated exclusively on the basis of official data provided by the State Committee for Statistics, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Ukraine, the State Stock Market and Securities Commission, the State Committee for Communications and Computerization, departments of regional state administrations and others. Investment attractiveness ratings were determined following original methods developed by experts of the Institute for Reforms and modified according to results of expert discussion involving experts of the Research Institute for Statistics at the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine.
We would like to emphasize that such regional rating has been made up for the fourth time since 1998. Results of rating research were delivered to representatives of central and local authorities, including regional state administrations and regional city administrations.

Summary report
In 2000, like in previous years, according to the investment attractiveness rating of Ukrainian regions there were three leaders, i.e. the city of Kyiv, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Kharkiv and Lviv regions belong to the group of leaders as well. Table 1 demonstrates dynamics of regional ratings.

Table 1. Investment Attractiveness Rating of Ukrainian Regions *